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Abstract: Some language encourages essentialist thinking. While philosophers have largely 
focused on generics and essentialism, I argue that nouns as a category are poised to refer to 
kinds and to promote representational essentializing. Our psychological propensity to 
essentialize when nouns are used reveals a limitation for anti-essentialist ameliorative 
projects. Even ameliorated nouns can continue to underpin essentialist thinking. I conclude 
by arguing that representational essentialism does not doom anti-essentialist ameliorative 
projects. Rather it reveals that would-be ameliorators ought to attend to the propensities for 
our representational devices to essentialize and to the complex relationship between 
essentialism and prejudice. 
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Some language encourages essentialist thinking. It promotes viewing categories as homogenous, 
explanatory, and inductively potent, and viewing category membership as determined by underlying 
hidden “essences”. By showing that nouns and their conceptual correlates are poised to essentialize, 
I argue that the prospects for certain political and social justice-oriented conceptual engineering 
projects are put at risk. When engaged in conceptual engineering one asks what concepts or 
linguistic expressions we ought to use and then advocates for revising, replacing, or abandoning our 
mental and linguistic resources accordingly.  The continued use of  nouns, even with re-engineered 2
contents, can undermine the success of  conceptual engineering projects which have anti-essentialist 
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aims. Would-be ameliorators ought to attend to the propensities for our representational devices to 
essentialize and to the complex relationship between essentialism and prejudice. 
 To begin to see the difference between the essentializing effects of  adjectives and nouns 
consider the following pairs of  sentences: 
1. a. Adrianne is female. 
                  b. Adrianne is a female. 
2. a. Dante is queer.  
       b. Dante is a queer. 
3. a. Lorraine is blonde.  
       b. Lorraine is a blonde. 
4. a. Maria is Mexican. 
       b. Maria is a Mexican. 
While the sentences differ minimally, you might have noticed a significant difference in their 
cognitive effects. The b sentences, which include predicate nominals, label or classify the subject. 
They invite thoughts that there are further shared, stable, and explanatory features of  the group or 
kind. They may also bring to mind stereotypes about the social kind. For instance speakers of  2b 
might be taken to imply that there are behavioral, psychological, or normative characteristics that 
queer people share. In contrast the a sentences, which include predicate adjectives, do not seem to 
convey that the subject belongs to a kind or group that is explanatorily significant. They do not 
encourage the same sorts of  stereotypical generalizations as the b sentences. These examples suggest 
a connection between lexical/conceptual categories, on the one hand, and essentializing, on the 
other.  
 Here I argue that the vehicles of  representation ought be taken into consideration when 
designing linguistic and conceptual prescriptions. In defining conceptual ethics, Burgess and Plunkett 
note that “[t]he phrase … trains our attention on content rather than form, suggesting that the 
structures or vehicles of  representation are ethically irrelevant.”  They disavow the implication and note 3
that this is merely a terminological shortcoming. The way nominal constructions, like in 1b-4b 
above, elicit essentialist thinking provides a concrete case to show why. Anti-essentialist ameliorative 
projects can fail to meet their chief  social and political end by failing to consider vehicles of  
representation. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. First, I set out our target class of  conceptual engineering 
projects—anti-essentialist ameliorative projects—and clarify what essentialism and anti-essentialism 
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amount to (§I). Then I use data from semantics and cognitive and developmental psychology to 
argue that the difference in the essentializing effects of  nouns and adjectives is robust (§II). While 
much of  the discussion of  language and essentialism has focused on generics,  I argue that 4
essentialist language goes far beyond constructions like ‘women are nurturing’. I focus on predicate 
nominals like those in 1b-4b, but gesture towards the more general view that it the lexical category, 
nouns, that is poised to elicit essentialist thinking. Next I argue that given our psychological tendency 
to essentialize, the prospects for anti-essentialist ameliorative projects are undermined when nouns 
are retained (§III). Finally I consider two responses for the would-be ameliorator (§IV). I argue that 
an eliminativist strategy faces significant normative and implementation worries. I then suggest that 
a more nuanced strategy that involves a distinction between pernicious and non-pernicious 
essentializing be pursued. The interplay between prejudice, identity, and essentialism point to 
defeasible constraints the ameliorator can use to guide her projects. Ameliorators ought to attend to 
our psychological propensities, but representational essentialism need not doom ameliorative 
projects. 
I. Anti-Essentialism and Ameliorative Projects 
Conceptual engineering projects come in varied forms. Our focus is on a class of  projects that 
involve (a) advocating for the use of  some concepts or expressions and (b) designing new 
conceptual or linguistic content for the purpose of  achieving political or social justice aims. I’ll call 
this restricted class of  conceptual engineering projects ameliorative projects. 
 Not all conceptual engineering is ameliorative. Some conceptual engineers aim to improve 
our understanding of  terms or concepts, rather than working to change our representational 
devices.  Other conceptual engineers propose that a concept or expression be abandoned. In 5
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contrast, ameliorative projects involve advocating for the use of  representational devices with new 
content. This could come in the form of  retaining and revising extant concepts or introducing and 
championing new representational devices (i.e., new pronouns like ze and zir). Not all conceptual 
engineering projects have political or social justice aims. For instance, a project might focus solely on 
making expressions more exact in the service of  clearer scientific explanations. Since such a project 
fails to meet (b) in the definition above, it is not ameliorative in the way I use the expression.  6
 The sorts of  social political aims an ameliorative project might have are likewise diverse. 
Broadly speaking they are aimed at mitigating oppression and breaking down power structures. One 
way to do so is through debunking the view that a kind is natural. They might also engage in efforts 
to construct identities and promote solidarity. And some ameliorative projects have anti-essentialist 
aims. Anti-essentialists argue that there is no shared essence of, e.g., all and only women. My focus 
here is on ameliorative projects with anti-essentialist aims. 
 Ameliorative accounts have been proposed for concepts of  gender, sexual orientation, race, 
and other social categories.  In order to work with a concrete illustration of  an ameliorative project, 7
I focus on Haslanger’s theory of  gender.  The argument made here is not specific to her account. 8
Rather, it reveals a general way that anti-essentialist ameliorative projects need to consider the 
propensities for representational devices to essentialize when working to meet anti-essentialist ends. 
 Haslanger argues for a revisionary view of  gender and gender terms and concepts. She 
proposes the following as a first pass definition: 
S is a woman iffdf S is systematically subordinated along some dimension 
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.) and S is “marked” as a target for this 
treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence 
of  a female’s biological role in reproduction.  9
She offers similar definitions for man (substituting privilege and male’s in the relevant places) and for 
racial groups (with substitutions based on presumed ancestry). She states that her project is semantic
—she is proposing definitions and “asking us to use an old term in a new way” and that it is political 
 For discussion of  different sorts of  ameliorative projects and aims see Haslanger “Going on, Not in the Same Way”.6
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as she’s “asking us to understand ourselves and those around us as deeply molded by injustice and to 
draw on the appropriate prescriptive inference.”  Her project is ameliorative. 10
 At some points Haslanger discusses social constructionist projects as revelatory rather than 
revisionary. For instance in a later article she says that rather than proposing a revised meaning a 
social constructionist might “reveal an existing one.”  Cappelen criticizes the view saying 11
“amelioration as revelation undermines the basic idea behind ameliorative projects” as it ends up 
being “essentially a purely descriptive project: the aim is to figure out what the extensions really are.”  12
The revelatory project isn’t revisionary and, so, is not ameliorative in the sense that I am using the 
term. Given the more revisionist things she says at other points, there is at least one reasonable 
interpretation of  Haslanger’s account on which it is ameliorative. I’ll interpret the view in that way 
for the purposes of  this paper.  13
 Haslanger has several social political goals in giving an account of  gender and race. She 
states that a framework needs to be “sensitive to both the similarities and differences among males 
and females, and the similarities and differences among individuals in groups demarcated by ‘color’; 
this includes the concern to identify the effects of  interlocking oppressions.”  A framework’s being 14
sensitive to differences involves avoiding what Haslanger calls the Commonality Problem, which 
questions whether there is anything social that all women have in common, that is, whether there is 
an essence shared by all women. Anti-essentialism is one political aim guiding her ameliorative 
project. 
 In order to better understand anti-essentialism and, ultimately, to see the problem that 
reliance on certain representation types poses for anti-essentialist ameliorative projects, we need to 
first get clearer on what essentialism is. Essentialism is used to pick out two classes of  views—one 
about representations and one about the world itself. Metaphysical essentialism is the view that entities 
(e.g., individuals, events, or kinds) have underlying essences. For instance the chemical kind water 
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might have the underlying essence of  being composed of  H2O.  Essences in the metaphysical sense 15
might be understood in terms of  metaphysically necessary features, grounds, fundamentality, or real 
definitions.  16
 Representational essentialism is the view that some of  our linguistic and mental devices (e.g., 
words, concepts) represent categories (or individuals) as having hidden underlying essences that 
determine category membership (or identity) and explain or cause other observable properties. The 
psychologist Susan Gelman describes representational essentialism as having two related 
components—one about kinds, the other about essences. The kind component is that “people 
treat certain categories as richly structured ‘kinds’ with clusters of  correlated properties.”  The 17
essence component is that “people believe a category has an underlying property (essence) that 
cannot be observed directly but that causes the observable qualities that category members share.”  18
Psychological research supports both components.  19
 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of  15
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(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of  Minnesota Press, 1975), 131–193.
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 Kinds are represented as having a number of  important features.  They are taken to be 20
cohesive and to have inductive potential. Membership in kinds is taken to be relatively stable and is 
often taken to be exclusive. People also take kinds to figure in certain forms of  explanation. And, 
importantly, these features hold of  our representations of  social kinds, like races and genders, as well 
as kinds like tigers and dogs.  21
 Existing research shows that we represent some kinds as having hidden internal essences 
that determine kind membership.  In much of  the psychological research essences are taken to be 22
innate, biological, and fixed at the origin of  birth.  However, work on dual character concepts and 23
essence, suggests that kinds might also have natural or evaluative essences. For instance, the essence 
of  an artist might be to realize one’s creativity by creating works with aesthetic value.   24
 Recent work has sought to further distinguish and clarify the relationship between 
representing a category as a kind and as having an essence.  Here, I adopt Gelman’s view of  25
representational essentialism as involving both kind and essence components for two reasons. First, 
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there is extensive precedent in the psychological literature for doing so. Second, and more 
importantly for our purposes, anti-essentialist arguments have targeted both. 
 Anti-essentialism as a view in critical theory is plausibly understood as an at least partially 
metaphysical, rather than representational, thesis. In the example that we are considering, it involves 
the claim that there is no underlying category-determining features shared by all and only women. 
Appiah argues that “in general, there isn’t some inner essence that explains why people of  a certain 
identity are the way they are.”  Here he is arguing that there fails to be an essence underlying race, 26
gender, ethnicity, and so on. He isn’t claiming that people do not believe that there are underlying 
essences.  
 Haslanger’s response to the Commonality Problem is also construed in metaphysical terms. 
She argues that a social kind with a contextually sensitive social positional nature fails to attribute an 
essence to kind members in the way that positing a biological or psychological essence of  the kind 
would. Moreover, shared social position allows for significant variation. So, Haslanger argues that the 
view avoids the problem and meets the aims that anti-essentialism requires.  This understanding of  27
anti-essentialism requires us to engage in social metaphysics.  
  A proponent of  anti-essentialism in metaphysics can reject metaphysical essentialism, while 
accepting that it is an unfortunate fact that representational essentialism is true. For instance while 
arguing for anti-essentialism and intersectionality as tools for dismantling oppressive power 
structures, Grillo states “We all have the impulse to essentialize. It is built into our brains.”  This 28
does not mean that representational essentialism is of  no concern to anti-essentialist theorists. 
Rather, as Grillo argues, we need to attend to the ways we essentialize in order to use anti-oppressive 
tools successfully. Applied to ameliorative projects, we need to attend to our psychological 
propensity to essentialize when designing and implementing social justice tools. Would-be 
ameliorators must grapple with representational essentialism in ways that one solely concerned with 
offering metaphysical analyses need not. To better see how anti-essentialists have engaged with 
representational essentialism, let’s next consider the prominent motivations for anti-essentialism. 
 Some anti-essentialist arguments single out the assumption that there is a hidden and intrinsic 
essence to a category—that is, they target the essence component of  representational essentialism. 
Many of  these arguments target the view that there is a biological essence underlying gender, racial, 
 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity (New York: Liveright, 2018), 29.26
 cf. Jenkins, “Amelioration and Inclusion” for arguments that the account fails to include trans women.27
 Trina Grillo, “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House,” Berkeley Women's Law 28
Journal. 10, no. 1 (1995): 16-30, 28.
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and other categories. For instance Witt calls the argument against a natural essence “the core 
argument” against kind essentialism.  And Stone states “feminist thinkers often use ‘essentialism’ 29
and ‘biological essentialism’ as interchangeable terms.”  Yet, anti-essentialist concerns go beyond 30
arguments against biological or psychological essences. Cultural essences or other social essences 
determining kind membership are no less essences than those requiring particular chromosomes or 
genitalia.  31
 Other feminist anti-essentialist arguments target features that are associated with the 
kindhood component of  representational essentialism. For instance, psychological research shows 
that inductive generalization is connected to kindhood.  Gender essentialism has been criticized for 32
leading to overgeneralizations. These are problematic not just in virtue of  being false but, as 
Narayan argues, "these generalizations are hegemonic in that they represent the problems of  
privileged women (most often white, Western, middle-class, heterosexual women) as paradigmatic 
‘women’s issues.’”  33
 Stability, another feature associated with the kind component of  representational 
essentialism, has also been objected to on anti-essentialist grounds. Grillo argues that essentialism 
assumes “being a member of  the group under discussion is a stable one, one with a clear meaning, a 
meaning constant through time, space, and different historical, social, political, and personal 
contexts.”  In arguing that gender is constituted by performance, Butler argues gender is not “a 34
stable identity”  and that there is no “essential and unrealized ‘sex’ or ‘gender.’”  Essentialism has 35 36
 Charlotte Witt, “Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Theory,” Philosophical Topics 23, no. 2 (1995): 321-344.29
 Alison Stone, “Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy,” Journal of  Moral Philosophy 1, no. 2  (2004): 30
135-153, 138.
 Witt, “Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Theory”; Stone, “Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism”; Uma Narayan, “Essence 31
of  Culture and a Sense of  History: A Feminist Critique of  Cultural Essentialism,” Hypatia 13, no. 2 (1998): 86-106.
  Rothbart and Taylor, “Category Labels and Social Reality”; Gelman, “Psychological Essentialism in Children”; Noyes 32
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been objected to given that what is taken to be required for membership in a gender group (or racial 
group or …) has varied significantly across time and place,  as well as within a culture.  37
 Finally, anti-essentialist arguments that rely on intersectionality also target another feature 
related to kindhood—exclusive membership. Anti-essentialist intersectional theorists argue that the 
attempt to subtract other forms of  oppression “elevates white, middle-class experience into the 
norm, making it the prototypical experience.”  Focusing on gender obscures the way that various 38
forms of  oppression (e.g., that due to class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, and so on) intersect in 
ways that are not merely additive.  Representational essentialism is at odds with the positions anti-39
essentialists have advocated.  
 As we have seen, not all anti-essentialist arguments target the same components of  
essentialism. Moreover, working to undermine one component of  representational essentialism is 
consistent with accepting another. For instance denying that there is an underlying biological essence 
to a kind is consistent with accepting there is a kind with inductive potential and exclusive stable 
membership. Since anti-essentialist arguments have targeted both the essence and kind components 
of  essentialism, I focus on projects with these broader aims for the time being. In Section IV I 
consider ways that an ameliorator might avoid pernicious forms of  essentialism without avoiding 
essentialism full stop. 
 Consider an ameliorative project with broad anti-essentialist aims. This project, like all 
ameliorative projects, is aimed at changing how we talk and think as a partial means to change how 
we behave. It might also have metaphysical aspirations. For instance, changes in how we represent or 
classify might have effects on behavior, expectations, and on social kinds themselves.  Insofar as 40
 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988).37
 Grillo, “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality,” 19.38
 bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press, 1981); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 39
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Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of  Chicago Legal Forum (1989): 139-167; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Mapping 
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of  Color," Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 
(1991):1241-99; Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of  Empowerment (New 
York: Routledge, 1990); María C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman, “Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, 
Cultural Imperialism, and the Demand for "The Woman's Voice”,” Women's Studies International Forum 6, no. 6 (1983): 
573-81.
 Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effects of  Human Kinds,” in Symposia of  the Fyssen Foundation. Causal cognition: A 40
Multidisciplinary Debate, eds. Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack (New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 351-394; Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of  What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000); Sally Haslanger, “Ontology and Social Construction,” Philosophical Topics 23, no. 2 (1995): 95-125; Rachel Cooper, 
“Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds," The British Journal for the Philosophy of  Science 55, no. 1 (2004): 73-85; Ron 
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either the existence or nature of  a social kind depends on our representations, changes in 
representations can have metaphysical effects.  In the first instance, however, anti-essentialist 41
ameliorative projects are aimed at undermining representational essentialism. For an ameliorative 
project (rather than a theory in social metaphysics) to meet its socio-political anti-essentialist ends, 
representational essentialism must be combatted. Let’s now turn to further support for the view that 
nouns trigger representational essentialism. 
II. The Distinction Between Nouns and Adjectives 
Data from psychology and semantics show that nouns and adjectives elicit a widespread difference 
in essentializing. Much of  the focus in the current literature has been on generics like ‘women are 
emotional.’  Here I motivate a broader view—nouns as a lexical category essentialize in ways that 42
adjectives do not. In order to keep our inquiry focused, I center our examination on predicate 
adjectives and predicate nominals (like in examples 1b-4b above). In addition to allowing for more 
careful tests to be run, the particular case study is interesting as the distinction between predicate 
adjectives and nominals has overwhelmingly been elided by semantic theories.  After presenting 43
data I motivate that the evidence for a difference between predicate adjectives and nominals extend 
to adjectives and nouns more generally. 
 There is extensive debate about the ways and extent to which social kinds depend on representations. Some hold that 41
representations or collective acceptance are crucial to constructing social kinds. See, e.g., Mallon, The Construction of  
Human Kinds; John Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of  Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). Others argue that at least some social kinds can exist without representations of  that kind itself  or in ways that do 
not involve mind-dependence at all. See, e.g., Amie Thomasson, “Social Entities,” in Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, 
eds. Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal, and Ross P. Cameron (London: Routledge 2009), 545-554; 
Muhammad Ali Khalidi, “Three Kinds of  Social Kinds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90, no. 1 (2015): 96-112; 
Rebecca Mason, “Against Social Kind Anti-Realism,” Metaphysics 3, no. 1 (2020). The degree to which projects that 
successfully ameliorate concepts/expressions will have metaphysical effects depends on what relationships hold between 
representations and kinds. For further relevant discussion see Ásta [published under "Ásta Sveinsdóttir”], “Social 
Construction," Philosophy Compass 10, no. 12 (2015): 884-892; Rebecca Mason, “The Metaphysics of  Social Kinds,” 
Philosophy Compass 11, no. 12 (2016): 841-850.
 Foster-Hanson et al., “How Does Generic Language Elicit Essentialist Beliefs?”; Rhodes, et al., “Cultural 42
Transmission of  Social Essentialism.”
 Ariel Cohen, “Generics and Mental Representations,” Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (2004): 529–556; Kai von Fintel and 43
Irene Heim, Intensional Semantics. (Lecture Notes, 2011); Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer, Semantics in Generative Grammar 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998); Richard Montague, “The Proper Treatment of  Quantification in Ordinary English,” in 
Approaches to Natural Language, eds. Jaakko Hintikka, Julius Moravcsik, and Patrick Suppes (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel 
1973), 221-242.
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IIa. Evidence from Cognitive Psychology   
Experiments in cognitive and developmental psychology reveal that expression types can affect the 
extent to which people engage in essentialist thinking. When a noun rather than adjective is used, 
both children and adults draw more robust inferences and judge features to be more inheritable, 
persistent, and explanatory. Using nouns to label, rather than adjectives to describe, can have 
significant cognitive effects. Psychologists Bigler and Liben hypothesize that “the mere act of  
categorization triggers processes involved in the construction of  social stereotypes.”  Gelman 44
argues “language that is used to express membership in a category can influence children’s 
judgments about that category” and that “[c]ount nouns imply that a category is relatively more 
stable and consistent over time and contexts than adjectives or verbal phrases.”  While she takes 45
representational essentialism to likely be ingrained in human cognition, using nouns strengthens 
essentialist thinking. 
  Studies have shown that children draw richer inferences in conditions when a noun is used 
(e.g., ‘bird’) than in conditions when adjectives are used (e.g., ‘sleepy’).  In a study involving 2-year-46
old children, Gelman and Coley found that children were more apt to rely on nominal labels than 
superficial similarities in appearance to draw inferences about atypical looking members of  a kind 
(e.g., dodo birds, pterodactyls).  For example, when a child was shown a picture of  a pterodactyl 47
and told “This is a dinosaur” they were more apt to think it would share properties with other 
dinosaurs, even though it appeared to be much more similar to a bird. In trials without any label, 
children inferred that the pterodactyl was likely to be similar to birds. In contrast using adjectival 
labels like “sleepy” and “wide awake” did not elicit the same inferential behavior. Rather, in these 
conditions children relied on similar appearances as they did in the no label cases. 
 Rebecca S. Bigler and Lynn S. Liben, “Developmental Intergroup Theory: Explaining and Reducing Children’s Social 44
Stereotyping and Prejudice,” Current Directions in Psychological Science. 16, no. 3 (2007): 162-166, 164.
 Gelman, “Psychological Essentialism in Children,” 407. 45
 Susan A. Gelman and Ellen M. Markman, “Young Children's Inductions from Natural Kinds: The Role of  Categories 46
and Appearances,” Child Development 58 (1987): 1532-1541; Susan A. Gelman and John D. Coley, “The Importance of  
Knowing a Dodo is a Bird: Categories and Inferences in 2-year-old Children," Developmental Psychology 26 (1990): 796-804; 
Sandra R. Waxman, “Linguistic Bias and the Establishment of  Conceptual Hierarchies: Evidence from Preschool 
Children,” Cognitive Development 5 (1990): 123-150; Vikram K. Jaswal and Ellen M. Markman, “Children’s Acceptance and 
Use of  Unexpected Category Labels to Draw Non-obvious Inferences,” in Proceedings of  the 24th Annual Conference 
of  the Cognitive Science Society, eds. Wayne D. Gray and Christian Schunn (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), 500-505; 
Susan A. Graham, Cari S. Kilbreath, and Andrea N. Welder, “Thirteen-month-olds Rely on Shared Labels and Shape 
Similarity for Inductive Inferences,” Child Development 75 (2004): 409–427.
 Gelman and Coley, “The Importance of  Knowing a Dodo is a Bird.”47
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 To test the differences in the strength of  import of  predicate nominals and predicate 
adjectives, Markman and Smith ran studies involving college students.  In their studies, they 48
presented participants with pairs like 5. 
5. a. John is liberal. 
        b. John is a liberal. 
Participants were asked to choose which of  the two seemed “to be a stronger or more powerful 
statement about the person” and rate the difference on a scale. They were then asked to write down 
“any ideas they had about what accounted for the differences they perceived.”  Overall, the 49
statements with predicate nominals were chosen far more than those with predicate adjectives as the 
stronger of  the pair. In describing the difference participants reported that the adjective seemed like 
just “one trait of  the individual” and like a “causal observation” that held “sometimes but not 
always.”  In contrast students reported that the nominal construction “implies [the trait is] a major 50
part of  his life”, is “like a name tag,” and involves “admittance to a select … group.”  51
 To test whether the nominal form or specific lexical knowledge is eliciting robust inferential 
judgments, Gelman and Heyman conducted experiments using novel predicate nominals.  They 52
tested children to determine whether judgments about persistence and resilience, were affected by 
nominal and habitual verbal constructions. They used examples like in 6. 
6. a. Rose eats carrots whenever she can. 
       b. Rose is a carrot-eater. 
Children took carrot-eating to be more persistent and resilient (e.g., maintained even with family 
disapproval) when nominals as in 6b, rather than habituals as in 6a were used.  Since carrot-eater is not 
a noun that the children were previously familiar with, they argued that the data show “children were 
not retrieving rote meanings, but rather made use of  a general rule that they applied to these novel 
noun phrases.”  53
 Studies reported in Markman, Categorization and Naming in Children, 123-125. For similar studies see Andrea 48
Carnaghi, Anne Maass, Sara Gresta, Mauro Bianchi, Mara Cadinu, and Luciano Arcuri, “Nomina Sunt Omina: On the 
Inductive Potential of  Nouns and Adjectives in Person Perception,” Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology 94 (2008): 
839-859.
 Markman, Categorization and Naming in Children, 123.49
 Ibid. 50
 Ibid.51
 Susan A. Gelman and Gail D. Heyman, “Carrot-Eaters and Creature-Believers: The Effects of  Lexicalization on 52
Children's Inferences About Social Categories," Psychological Science 10, no. 6 (1999): 489–493.
 Ibid., 491.53
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 Experimental evidence shows that nouns have systematic effects on the judgments and 
inferences children and adults are apt to draw about category members. Data also reveal that the 
differences in inferential judgments from predicate nominals and predicate adjectives that we relied 
on in the pairs in 1-4 are robust and, importantly, that the phenomenon is productive. To further 
support the distinction, in the next two sections I consider linguistic data involving predicate 
adjectives and predicate nominals. 
IIb. Contrastive Data 
First, let’s consider the way a predicate adjective or predicate nominal might be used in a 
conversational exchange like in 7. 
7. A: Is Linnea a blonde? 
       B: Well, she is blonde, but I wouldn’t say she is a blonde. 
In the exchange, B avoids an outright yes- or no-answer. Instead, she hedges using “well” and noting 
that she wouldn’t use the nominal “a blonde” to label Linnea (and perhaps also the stronger claim 
that she wouldn’t use it to label anyone at all). If  B were to agree outright, it seems she would 
commit to something stronger than that Linnea is flaxen-haired, for instance that there is some 
nature blonde people share or that Linnea has certain stereotypical qualities that are associated with 
the group. Note also, that if  B were to give an explicit negative answer, B would be committing 
herself  to the claim that Linnea is not blonde. If  Linnea is blonde and B is being cooperative, she 
would not want to give an explicit negative answer. In contrast, the conversational pattern in 8 does 
not require the same hedging in order to avoid essentializing, categorizing, or generalizations.  
8. A: Is Linnea blonde? 
        B: Yes, she is. 
In fact, if  B were to follow up in 8 with “but I wouldn’t say she is a blonde,” it would sound fairly 
odd, as that was not at issue given A’s utterance. 
 Outside of  conversational exchanges, data show that constructions involving predicating an 
adjective of  a subject while, in the same breathe, denying that the nominal holds of  them are 
felicitous. 
9. George is conservative, but not a conservative.  54
 William F. Buckley, Jr. described George W. Bush in this way. Another similar example can be found in a biography of  54
the British Cold War spy, Jeremy Wolfenden. Sebastian Faulks, The Fatal Englishman (London: Vintage Books, 1997). 
There it is reported that a schoolmate told him to “Be queer, but not a queer”. Idid., 222.
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In contrast, attributing and then denying an adjective or a nominal as in 10-11 sounds at least 
somewhat infelicitous if  not straightforwardly contradictory.  
10. # George is conservative, but not conservative. 
11. # George is a conservative, but not a conservative.  
IIc. Cancellation Data 
Finally let’s consider the extent to which inferences from predicate nominals can be explicitly 
canceled. The speaker of  12 is apparently trying to cancel something with the second clause. 
12. He’s a queer, but I like queers! 
They might be attempting to cancel the inference between being queer and meeting some 
stereotypes, or between having some negative features because one is queer, but the inference from 
the first clause of  12 to there being a group that has persistent explanatory qualities is not canceled. 
That is, the speaker of  12 is not denying that there is a category or kind that is a stable locus for 
inferential judgments. One can imagine the speaker following up 12 with a list of  features they take 
queer folks to share, but which they take to be positive. Suppose one explicitly attempts to cancel the 
inference that there is a group one is categorizing the person in as in 13. 
13. ?? She’s a female, but females are not a group with shared explanatory characteristics. 
13 is strange, in part, because the first clause strongly elicits the judgment that females do share some 
persistent explanatory traits. In some contexts a variant of  13 might be more acceptable. For 
instance, suppose we’re in a context in which job candidate’s are being discussed. Someone is 
speaking about candidates as “females.” Someone might express frustration and utter 13 or 13’. 
 13’.  ?? She’s a female, but there is nothing more to being a female than being female.  
In some contexts cancellation might be possible, but it is not easy.  55
 The evidence considered in IIa-IIc shows that the distinction between predicate nominals and 
predicate adjectives is robust.  In general, sentences of  the form ‘c is an F’ elicit the inference that 56
there is a kind or group, Fs, with shared, stable, and explanatory features. I’ll call inferences of  the 
form ‘Fs share further traits that are explanatory and stable’ essentializing inferences. Nouns vary widely 
in the specific features, stereotypes, negative/positive valence, and so on that are brought to mind. 
There are clearly differences in saying someone is a doctor, a New Yorker, or a Black. Yet, each is 
plausibly stable and is taken to have inductive and explanatory potential. While we do not take New 
 Thanks to Matt Teichman for this example.55
 For further evidence and development of  a semantics for these constructions, see Katherine Ritchie, “Essentializing 56
Inferences” (manuscript). 
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Yorkers to be a biological category, many do take them to be fast walkers and to overpay for 
housing. The claim being made here is that the use of  nouns encourages representational essentialist 
thinking in at least this general form. We infer that there is more to being an F than just being F.    57
 While I have focused primarily on nouns and adjectives in predicate position, much of  the 
data supports the stronger view that nouns as a lexical category are poised to essentialize in a way 
that adjectives are not.  Data from cognitive and developmental psychology, including many of  the 58
studies reported on in IIa, do. Generics like 14 and 15 support the broader view as well. 
14. Women are nurturing. 
15. Pigs like mud. 
Quantified statements like in 16 and 17 also seem to reinforce essentialist thinking. They too involve 
labeling people as members of  social groups 
16. A queer wrote the best paper in my class.  
17. Ten blondes are in that store. 
Data show that statements with high proportion quantifiers like in 18 also elicit essentialism.  59
 Some adjectives can represent features as essential (e.g., human, intelligence). So, one might ask, what are nouns really 57
doing? My claim is not that language essentializes if  and only if  it involves nouns. Rather the claim is that nominals elicit 
stronger judgments of  persistence, resilience, stability, explanatoriness, coherence, and so on. Given world knowledge, 
some adjectives might lead to very high judgments on these features as well. Yet, even in cases in which an adjective 
might be taken to be essential and to have a biological basis, nominals convey something stronger and more stable. For 
instance, consider i and ii. 
i. A: He’s idiotic.  
       B: ?? No, he’s just an idiot. 
ii. A: He’s an idiot.  
       B. No, he’s just idiotic.  
The felicity differences can be explained by the fact that nouns as a lexical category are poised to essentialize. Thanks to 
Uriah Kriegel for pressing me on this point. 
 Here I have also focused only on English data. Not all languages include articles, like the indefinite article a that marks 58
the difference in surface form between English predicate adjectives and predicate nominals. Distinct lexical categories 
for nouns and adjectives are, however, widely held to be universal amongst human languages. In languages without 
articles, different data would be needed to reveal the divergent effects of  nouns and adjectives. For example, see Sylvie 
Graf, Michal Bilewicz, Eerika Finell, and Daniel Geschke, “Nouns Cut slices: Effects of  Linguistic Forms on Intergroup 
Bias,” Journal of  Language and Social Psychology, 32, no. 1 (2013): 62–83. In these studies, Graf  et al. examined the effects 
using nouns or adjectives for nationality had on inter-group bias. To allow for similar conditions across subjects, some of  
whom spoke languages with articles (e.g., German), some of  whom spoke languages without articles (e.g., Finnish), they 
used stimuli which used different punctuation. For instance, the nationality term must be interpreted as a noun in stimuli 
of  the form a Finn, a painter (in Finnish: suomalainen, taidemaalari) while an adjectival interpretation is required in forms 
like a Finnish painter (in Finnish: suomalainen taidemaalari). They found that expressing nationality with a noun augmented 
in-group bias more than expressing it with an adjective. I thank an anonymous associate editor for pressing me on this 
point. 
 Elena Hoicka, Jennifer Saul, Eloise Prouten, Laura Whitehead, and Rachel Sterken. 2018. “Language Signalling High 59
Proportions, Not Just Generics, Leads to Essentializing for Novel Social Kinds,” (under review). doi:10.31234/osf.io/
xe6sj.
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18. Many /  Most Zarpies love to eat flowers. 
Moreover, Leslie and Gelman have also found that quantified statements are often recalled as 
generics, further bolstering the idea that the use of  nouns bound by quantifiers essentialize.  60
 Essentialist thinking is not elicited to the same degree by each and every noun. Evidence 
shows that nouns for natural kinds and social kinds tend to license stronger inferences than those 
for artifacts.  There are also variations in the extent to which we essentialize when presented with 61
nouns for human kinds. For instance, Newman and Knobe argue that we represent social categories 
like scientists and friends, but not waiters and bus drivers, as having essences.  The general form of  62
essentializing inferences allows for significant variability. It does not require that one have robust 
stereotypes, negative affect toward the kind, or that one posit a biological essence. Rather, it involves 
nouns being used for categories that are viewed as kinds and that kinds are taken to have shared, 
stable, and explanatory features. There is good psychological and linguistic evidence for a close 
connection between nouns and essentializing. 
 We now have the first two components needed for my argument. We have homed in on our 
target class of  ameliorative projects—anti-essentialist projects that aim to ameliorate nouns. We also 
have evidence showing a robust connection between nouns and representational essentialism. Next I 
turn to the problem these ameliorative projects must confront.  
III. The Effects of  Representational Essentialism on Ameliorative Projects  
The data in the last sections showed that nominals and their conceptual correlates elicit essentialist 
thinking. They signal that there is a kind that is cohesive, homogenous, has inductive potential, and 
so on. The form of  the essentializing inferences I suggested was general—‘Fs share further traits 
that are explanatory and stable.’ Changing the content of  a particular expression, won’t change its 
connection to representational essentialism. Further, we saw that the pattern is productive (e.g., in 
the example with carrot-eater). It does not rely on particular stereotypes or characteristics. Rather, it is 
the use of  the nominal itself  that underpins essentializing. In asking us to revise the content of  
expressions or concepts while retaining nominal/labeling terminology, we will continue to be poised 
to essentialize. 
 Sarah-Jane Leslie and Susan A. Gelman, “Quantified Statements are Recalled as Generics,” Cognitive Psychology 64 60
(2012): 186–214.
 Gelman, The Essential Child.61
 Newman and Knobe, “The Essence of  Essentialism.”62
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 The sorts of  representational devices ameliorators focus on make the problem more 
pressing. Using nouns to label someone as a woman or a Black person or a queer or … can 
underscore the idea that that is what the person is. That being a woman or a Black person or … 
underlies the person’s very nature and explains their aptitudes, preferences, and behavior. This can 
undermine the person’s agency; it can dehumanize. It also brings to salience membership in a 
socially subordinate group, perhaps serving to motivate further domination or cruelty.  63
 Note that the worry I am advancing is not the general claim that identity-based political 
projects essentialize. Many have argued that appeals to identity categories are essentialist, 
exclusionary, inherently tied to oppression, and, consequently, that appealing to such categories is 
antithetical to achieving social justice aims. For instance, Butler argues “the category of  ‘women’, the 
subject of  feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of  power through which 
emancipation is sought.”  Bettcher argues that some “radical feminists … lapse into essentialist 64
appeals to chromosomes as the invariant determinants of  sex.”  Some theorists take these 65
essentialist worries to doom identity politics.  Others defend identity-based projects arguing that 66
standpoints need not essentialize, that anti-essentialist intersectionality can be promoted, and that 
identity politics can involve transformative and resistant identities.  The argument I am making here 67
is focused specifically on ameliorative projects aimed at changing our thought and speech. The claim 
 Kate Manne, “Humanism: A Critique,” Social Theory and Practice 42, no. 2 (2016): 389-415.63
 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of  Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 2.64
 Talia Mae Bettcher, “Intersexuality, Transgender, and Transsexuality,” in The Oxford Handbook of  Feminist Theory, eds. L. 65
Disch and M. Hawkesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 407-427, 422.
 Wendy Brown, States of  Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); 66
Appiah, The Lies that Bind.  
 Linda Alcoff, “Who’s Afraid of  Identity Politics?,” in Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of  67
Postmodernism, eds. P.M.L. Moya and M.R. Hames-García (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 2000), 312–44; 
Bettcher, “Intersexuality, Transgender, and Transsexuality”; Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: 
The Sociological Significance of  Black Feminist Thought,” in The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political 
Controversies, ed. Sandra G. Harding (New York: Routledge, 2004), 103-126; Sharon Crasnow, “Feminist Anthropology 
and Sociology: Issues for Social Science,” in Philosophy of  Anthropology and Sociology, eds. Stephen P. Turner and Mark J. 
Risjord (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 755-790; Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledge: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of  Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575-599; Sandra Harding, “A 
Socially Relevant Philosophy of  Science? Resources from Standpoint Theory's Controversiality,” Hypatia 19 (2004): 
25-47; Susan Hekman, “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited,” Signs 22, no. 21 (1997): 341-365; 
Grillo, “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality”; Ann Ferguson, “Resisting the Veil of  Privilege: Building Bridge 
Identities as an Ethico-Politics of  Global Feminisms," Hypatia 13, no. 3 (1998): 95–113; Katherine Ritchie, “Does 
Identity Politics Reinforce Oppression? Philosophers’ Imprint (forthcoming); Stone, “Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism”; 
Allison Weir, “Global Feminism and Transformative Identity Politics,” Hypatia 23, no. 4 (2008):110–133; Iris Marion 
Young, Justice and the Politics of  Difference. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Iris Marion Young, “Gender as 
Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective,” Signs 19, no. 3(1994): 713-738.
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is that certain sorts of  representational devices—nouns and their conceptual correlates—pose a 
problem for anti-essentialist ameliorative projects. Let’s turn to spelling out the worry in more detail.  
 Return to the example of  a theorist engaged in an anti-essentialist ameliorative project 
focused on gender. Perhaps in the throes of  theorizing the conceptual engineer can avoid 
essentialism. In the context of  offering her theory, some of  the theorist’s uses of  nouns may be 
metalinguistic.  For example, the theorist might utter 19, in part aiming to advocate for a trans 68
inclusive meaning of  woman. 
19. Laverne Cox is a woman.  
Her theorizing here explicitly focuses on which individuals fall in the extension of  a term or 
concept. She might engage in metalinguistic negotiation with someone who rejects 19.  She could 69
justify the meaning she advocates by, for example, appealing to normative considerations, noting that 
the meaning correctly classifies many individuals and subkinds, and by explaining away cases that 
violate what some take to be common sense.  
 The theorist might also explicitly work to cancel essentializing inferences. Recall the 
cancellation data we considered above (repeated below). 
 13.  She’s a female, but females are not a group with shared explanatory characteristics. 
 13’.  She’s a female, but there is nothing more to being a female than being female. 
The second clauses in 13 and 13’ sound significantly more natural when considered in the context 
of  an ameliorative project. 
 Cases of  what Sterken calls communicative disruptions provide another opportunity for the 
ameliorator to push for revision.  Sterken considers a case like the following. Suppose that an 70
ameliorator begins using and interpreting woman to in the way Haslanger proposed, but with the full 
understanding that this will lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. In some context she 
might say “we should work to eradicate women!” with the intention of  conveying that we should 
attempt to eliminate gender-based subordination. As Sterken puts it, her utterance involves an 
attempt to “disrupt the interpretive common ground so as to affect metalinguistic reflection and 
 Chris Barker, “The Dynamics of  Vagueness,” Linguistics and Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2002):1–36; David Plunkett and 68
Timothy Sundell, “Disagreement and the Semantics of  Normative and Evaluative Terms,” Philosophers’ Imprint 13, no. 
23(2013): 1–37.
 Plunkett and Sundell, “Disagreement and the Semantics of  Normative and Evaluative Terms.”69
 Rachel K. Sterken, “Linguistic Interventions and Transformative Communicative Disruption,” in Conceptual Engineering 70
and Conceptual Ethics, eds. Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2020), 417-424.
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reconstruction on the part of  her interlocutor.”  The disruptor’s usage of  woman is meant to 71
encourage metalinguistic rumination that will contribute to linguistic transformation. The speaker 
could have used language that would not have been disruptive. For instance, she might have said “we 
should work to eradicate gender-based oppression!” In opting for the disruptive utterance, the 
speaker’s aim is, at least in part, to revise or transform the meaning of  woman. The speaker has 
intentions that are metalinguistic. She is encouraging her interlocutors to engage at the metalinguistic 
level. When using expressions metalinguistically and when speakers engage in communicative 
disruptions, essentializing inferences might be canceled or avoided. 
 I have doubts that even the most committed conceptual engineer with their, ahem, human 
psychology can completely avoid representational essentialism. By way of  comparison, consider 
work on the linguistic contributions of  slurs. Even when slurs are mentioned in the act of  theorizing 
they are often taken to be offensive and to convey something negative. This judgment is had even by 
many philosophers and linguists, people who certainly recognize the difference between use and 
mention. If  mentioning a slur has significant shared cognitive effects with the use of  a slur, 
mentioning or engaging in metalinguistic negotiation with an expression that essentializes might as 
well. Nevertheless, even if  we suppose that the theorist and her interlocutors avoid essentializing 
while they are actively engaged in conceptual engineering, this is not sufficient to show that 
ameliorative projects can meet their anti-essentialist aims.  
 The success of  ameliorative projects requires ordinary, not just metalinguistic, usage to 
accord with ameliorated meanings. For an ameliorative project to achieve its anti-essentialist aims it 
needs to help a wide range of  people avoid assuming there is an underlying essence of  a social 
category. As Haslanger stated the semantic component involves “asking us to use an old term in a 
new way.”  If  us only refers to theorists, it is dubitable that much social progress will be made. An 72
ameliorative project is not successful if  it merely allows the theorist, the committed reader, or those 
engaged in metalinguistic negotiation to avoid essentializing while engaged in actively engaged in 
these sorts of  projects. 
 In offering up new definitions, the conceptual engineer might get us to think in a different 
way while considering their theory or reflecting on how our language ought to be. Yet, once we 
begin using terminology with revised meanings, we essentialize anew. Even if, we might have been 
inclined to say, the anti-essentialist ameliorative project is successful, we will continue to essentialize. 
 Ibid., 421.71
 Haslanger, “Gender and Race”, 48.72
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Even when they "succeed," it seems ameliorative projects that involve nouns fall back into 
essentialism’s clutches. 
 If  ameliorative projects for nominals and their conceptual correlates fail to avoid 
essentializing, a more general worry also comes to salience. Essentializing is connected to 
stereotyping and prejudice. The extent of  the correlation and whether it exists across all social 
categories is still being investigated.  Insofar as there is a robust and widespread connection, 73
ameliorators should be even more worried about language that elicits essentializing inferences. For 
instance, Leslie argues “the use of  generics or even simply labels may communicate that these are 
essentializable groups, and so open the door to prejudice.”  At their inception, ameliorative projects 74
are aimed at undermining oppression. If  essentializing is closely connected to prejudice, the general 
social justice aims of  ameliorative projects (i.e., even those not focused on anti-essentialism) are also 
undermined by continuing to use nominals.  
IV. What is the Would-Be Ameliorator to Do?  
Given the aim to uphold anti-essentialism outside of  the limited contexts of  theorizing and worries 
about the connection between essentialism and prejudice, a would-be ameliorative might decide to 
abandon ameliorative projects altogether. Recall that ameliorative projects involve advocating for 
the use of  terms/concepts for social-political ends. The arguments in the last section could be taken 
to show that what is needed (at least when considering ameliorative projects that involve nouns and 
have anti-essentialist aims) is an elimination strategy. On this strategy the would-be ameliorator aims 
to eliminate nouns in favor of  adjectives or verbs. Projects like these are still in the realm of  
conceptual engineering.  For instance Burgess and Plunkett suggest that eliminativism be used “for 75
the distinctly normative, representational view that we ought to stop using a given term or concept. 
Thus construed, eliminativism is a position within conceptual ethics.”  In adopting an eliminativist 76
strategy, the would-be ameliorator gives up on an ameliorative project, but she does not give up on 
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of  Social Psychology 41, no. 1 (2002): 87–100; Nick Haslam and Sheri R. Levy, “Essentialist Beliefs About Homosexuality: 
Structure and Implications for Prejudice,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32, no. 4 (2006): 471–485; Noyes and 
Dunham, “Separating Kindhood from Naturalness.” 
 Leslie, “The Original Sin of  Cognition,” 418.74
 Burgess and Plunkett, “Conceptual Ethics II”; Cappelen, Fixing Language.75
 Burgess and Plunkett, “Conceptual Ethics II,” 1103.76
21
conceptual engineering across the board. Perhaps an eliminative, rather than revisionary, form of  
conceptual engineering is a better method of  conceptual engineering for those with social justice 
aims.  
 There are advocates for social-political eliminativist projects. Leslie suggests that avoiding 
generics and labels might be a way to avoid essentializing and limit prejudice.  She states “reducing 77
the use of  labels and generics for racial, ethnic, and religious groups may reduce the extent to which 
children grow up essentializing these groups.”  Her view coheres with what the recommendation 78
from the CDC and some disability rights activists that person-first language be used when referring 
to people with disabilities. For instance, the CDC recommends  the use of  person with epilepsy over 
epileptic.  Dembroff  and Wodak argue that we should not use gendered pronouns. One of  their 79
motivations is to avoid essentialism.  The would-be ameliorator might emulate these projects and 80
argue that nouns (or nouns for social groups and social roles) should be eliminated.    
 In some instances, eliminativism might be the best option to meet a given social-political 
aim. Perhaps some nouns should be eliminated in favor of  adjectives. This is one option that the 
conceptual engineer should keep in her arsenal.  Yet, there are both normative and implementation 81
worries that undermine a wholesale adoption of  an eliminativist response to the problem. Let’s 
consider normative worries first.  
 In some cases other factors might outweigh the anti-essentialist aims of  a social justice 
project. For instance, many disability rights theorists have rejected person-first language and have 
advocated for identity-first language (e.g., autistic person) or nominals (e.g., an autistic or Aspie). For 
instance, Sinclair argues that person-first language wrongly suggests that disability is separable, 
transient, and not central or important to the person’s identity.  He argues against each of  these and 82
for identity-first locutions that emphasize the centrality and importance of  disability to personal 
identity. Moreover, disability rights theorists argue that person-first language wrongly implies that 
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disabilities like autism are negative and to be hidden, rather than identities to be affirmed and 
validated.  83
 If  nouns are to be avoided, then generic constructions with nouns in subject position ought 
to be avoided as well. But, several philosophers have argued that the benefits of  certain social 
generics might outweigh the potential harms of  essentializing. Narayan argues that not all generics 
convey cohesiveness or homogeneity. For instance she argues that a generic like women are 
discriminated against in public and private spheres in myriad ways does not entail “the absence of  variations 
within and across national contexts in the form of  human rights violations that confront different 
groups of  women.”  Generics like this one might be useful in political contexts. Other generics 84
such as boys like pink too might be helpful in combatting certain norms.  Since generics often require 85
correlations that are stronger than mere statistical accident, social generics might also be the best 
linguistic tools we have for accurately describing structural forms of  oppression.  Insofar as 86
accurate descriptions are useful for successfully combatting oppression, we would have good reason 
to use social generics. This suggests that nouns, even in the form of  generic generalizations, can 
positively contribute to social justice projects. 
 More generally, nominals provide important resources that increase the expressive potential 
of  a language.  For instance, expressing laws aimed at mitigating the oppression of  groups that 87
have been historically marginalized involves reference to categories of  people, not just individual 
people. Concepts and expressions for social categories allow for us to identify, explain, and hopefully 
change forms of  oppression.  88
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 Even if  the eliminativist strategy could be justified on political and ethical grounds, we 
should not be overly optimistic about its potential for success. On the eliminativist strategy nouns 
for social groups and social roles are to be eliminated and replaced by expressions in another lexical 
category. To make the case concrete, suppose they are replaced by adjectives. Saul argues that 
expressions that begin their lives as adjectives, are apt to begin to function as labels over time.  For 89
instance she notes that the attempt to replace moron and idiot with mentally retarded person was 
unsuccessful. The adjective became a noun. Moreover, terms that are replacements for negatively 
valenced terms tend to become pejorative. The way terms for mentally disabled people and 
stigmatized racial groups have been replaced again and again provide vivid examples.  
 Instead of  abandoning ameliorative projects completely, let’s consider a more nuanced 
response to the problem. With increased nuance we enter murky waters full of  complexities and 
specificities that reveal ways an account will need to balance psychological, moral, social-political, 
and linguistic factors. The social world and our representations of  it are complex. The fact that there 
is not a simple response (eliminate all nouns!) for the ameliorator should come as no surprise. 
 To begin to see the shape a strategy for the would-be ameliorator ought to take, let’s return 
to a claim I made about language in II. I argued that broadly speaking nouns are poised to elicit 
essentializing inferences. I argued that the sorts of  inferences nouns as a class elicit are general and 
non-evaluative. They are of  the form ‘Fs share further traits that are explanatory and stable.’ So, on 
this view, essentializing itself  does not entail stereotyping or prejudiced beliefs. These negative 
features are not built into the account and additional nominal constructions provide strong reason to 
doubt the view that they are. 
 There are many nouns that do not seem to elicit negative inferences. For instance consider 
the following example. 
20. Laura is a doctor. 
20 involves attributing kind membership to the subject and an essentializing inference that the kind 
shares further stable and explanatory features. For instance, in learning that Laura is a doctor, one 
might infer that she has an M.D., meets with patients, has an obligation to care for her patients, is 
intelligent, and so on. These features are associated with being a doctor. Yet, an utterance of  20 
would not normally imply anything negative. It does not serve to dehumanize Laura or minimize her 
agency. The lack of  negative valence and dehumanization can be explained in part by the nature of  
different sorts of  social kinds and in part by particular attitudes and associations we have with 
specific kinds. 
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 Members of  social kinds like doctors, dentists, professors, and point guards have reasonably 
well defined institutional roles. These might be specified in various ways. For instance, they might be 
specified in a job description or a hospital code of  conduct. An official rulebook for a sports league 
could define what a player in a particular position is allowed to do and coaches, choreographers, and 
art critics can design plays, performances, and norms that shape and constrain social roles. The way 
these kinds depend on social factors like laws and rules is overt; given a bit of  reflection it is obvious 
that there is a dependence relation.  While some aptitudes might be rooted in genetics, we do not 90
take one’s profession to be biologically determined. Further, while one’s personality, physical 
aptitudes, and other traits might make one well suited to be a pitcher, musician, or lawyer, we also 
take there to be considerable volition in determining whether one becomes a member of  these social 
kinds. Certainly it is not wholly up to an individual whether she can join one of  these social kinds, 
but there seems to be an element of  choice and an exercise of  agency—at least in terms of  whether 
one sets out to join the kind.  
 Kinds like race, gender, and sexual orientations are different. They are not closely tied to 
institutionalized roles, like those explicitly set out in employee manuals, even though on many views 
they do depend on social factors. Gender, racial, ethnic, disability, and other identity kinds depend 
on social factors in ways that are often covert.  Social kinds like these often appear to be biological 91
or otherwise natural. For instance when theorizing about gender Simone de Beauvoir argues that it 
can be hard “to measure the enormous extent of  social discrimination … whose moral and 
intellectual repercussions are so deep in woman that they appear to spring from an original nature.”  92
Psychological research shows that even from a young age children think of  gender categories as 
having natural underlying essences.  93
 In taking these kinds to have biological essences, membership is taken to be outside of  an 
agent’s control. This may be because membership in these kinds is not volitional (e.g., one is 
attributed membership in a social kind largely in virtue of  what others assume about one’s body or 
ancestry) or because while membership is volitional, many mistakenly believe them to be biological 
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and determined by one’s genetics. What is important for our purposes is that people often 
(implicitly) hold that an agent does not have control over whether they are in a racial, gender, or 
other identity kind. 
 These considerations and the contrast between cases like 20 and 1b-4b point to three 
correlations between features of  a kind and whether it essentializes in ways that are likely to be 
pernicious. 
Biology: The less a noun for a social kind is taken to categorize based on biological features, 
the less likely it is to perniciously essentialize (e.g., increase prejudice). 
Overt Dependence: The more a noun for a social kind is taken to categorize based on features 
that are taken to depend on social factors, the less likely it is to perniciously essentialize (e.g., 
increase prejudice). 
Agency: The more a noun for a social kind is taken to categorize based on features within an 
agent’s control, the less likely it is to perniciously essentialize (e.g., increase prejudice). 
Consider the noun doctor. Since membership in the kind doctors is taken to only minimally depend 
on biology and is largely taken to be overtly dependent on social factors and involve some volition 
on membership conditions, it is unlikely to essentialize in a pernicious way. In contrast, since 
membership in racial and gender kinds are often taken to be biological and are not taken to be 
overtly social or volitional, labeling someone as a Black or a female is more likely to essentialize in a 
pernicious way. If  these principles are on the right track, when ameliorating nouns the conceptual 
engineer could work to change content and associated beliefs in order to undermine the view that a 
kind is biological and augment the view that it is overtly social dependent and volitional.  
 While the principles outlined above might serve as a good defeasible guide for the 
ameliorator, they do not provide exceptionless rules. There are two sorts of  cases that reveal 
problems with the constraints. Both point to the need for successful ameliorators to attend to 
ideologies and broader views on morality and responsibility.  
 First, people have negative attitudes towards some social kinds that are not represented as 
biological and are taken to be overtly social and within the volition of  an agent. Labels for these 
kinds could still figure in potentially pernicious forms of  essentialist labeling. For instance, while 
negative attitudes towards doctors are rare, negative attitudes towards bankers, cops, and politicians 
are somewhat common. Negative attitudes towards felons, prisoners, drug dealers, and sex workers 
are even more common.  For instance, 21 seems to label in a pernicious way. 
21. Jordan is a felon. 
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Ameliorative projects that are designed with these three principles in mind can still elicit pernicious 
essentializing effects.  94
 Second, there is evidence that in some cases increasing views that a kind is biological and 
undermining its membership being volitional elicit less prejudice. For example, Haslam and colleagues 
found that judgments that being gay is natural were correlated with less prejudice than judgments 
that being gay was not natural.  Given dominance of  heteronormative views in U.S. society, the 95
view that one chooses to “violate” social and moral norms may elicit stronger prejudice than the 
view that homosexuality is biologically determined (one is “born this way”).  Garretson and Suhay 96
found that biological attributions of  homosexuality increase support for gay rights.  They also 97
found correlations between political affiliation and acceptance of  biological views of  sexual 
orientation. Liberals were more likely to endorse biological views than conservatives.  
 To give one final example, consider the view that alcoholism is a disease and the view that 
alcoholism involves a choice. The choice view might be connected with stronger stigma and 
attributions of  personal moral responsible. In contrast, on the disease-model people might be more 
apt to judge that it is outside of  a person’s control and, so, hold individual kind members to be less 
responsible. These cases do not show that the three principles are hopeless. Rather, they point to 
ways ideology and views of  morality, responsibility, and norm-violation interact with essentialist 
thinking and prejudice.  
 Let’s briefly return to Haslanger’s ameliorative project. Recall that she takes gender kinds to 
be defined in terms of  subordination and privilege. These kinds specify roles or positions in social 
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structures.  The account aims to change our views of  gender and racial kinds to highlight, and so 98
make more overt, their social structural nature. She also aims to debunk the view that they have 
biological essences. The account does not, however, take kind membership to be under the volition 
of  a person. Rather, one is a woman if  one is subordinated due to perceived or imagined bodily 
features. These are largely based on external features that are outside of  the control of  an agent.  
 While  the design of  Haslanger’s ameliorative project fits with Biology and Overt Dependence, it 
does not meet Agency.  Whether this is sufficient to avoid stereotyping, prejudice, and oppression is 99
an open question. More research is needed to understand the complex interplay between roles, 
volition, and naturalness (on the one hand) and pernicious attitudes and actions (on the other). 
 Ameliorative projects have focused on designing new contents for representational devices. 
Here I have argued that ameliorators must also attend to the structures or vehicles of  representation. 
Nouns and their conceptual correlates are poised to elicit essentializing inferences in ways that affect 
whether an ameliorative project can meet anti-essentialist aims. Ameliorative projects are not thereby 
doomed. Rather the ameliorator can attend to the ways representational vehicles might essentialize 
in ways that are not pernicious. Ameliorators with anti-essentialist aims can work to engineer terms 
and concepts by defeasibly following the constraints given by Biology, Overt Dependence, and Agency. 
The interplay of  these constraints and broader moral and political ideologies reveals that there is not 
a simple  set of  rules to which the ameliorator can subscribe. But one thing is clear, the structure of  
our language and thought can significantly affect what we’re apt to judge and infer about others and 
ourselves.
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